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The Time for Judgment Has
Arrived: The Zivotofsky v.
Clinton Effect on the Political
Question Doctrine’s Application
to the War Powers Resolution
Shannon M. Doughty 1
The War Powers Resolution was enacted to serve as a
congressional restraint on the President’s power to engage in Military
Action. Since then, Congress and the President have disagreed over
the enforcement and constitutionality of the statute. Nonetheless, courts
have dismissed cases regarding the War Powers Resolution claiming it
is of a solely political nature i.e. a political question. The Judiciary
traditionally apply the political question doctrine to issues regarding
foreign affairs and, in effect, avoided hearing cases regarding the
specifics of the war powers pertaining to Executive and Congress. This
lack of judicial determination has resulted in the and unclear
assignment of constitutional war powers authority to the branches. In
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Supreme Court held that the political question
doctrine cannot be applied to cases regarding statutory and
constitutional interpretation. This narrowing of the political question
doctrine potentially lowers the standard of justiciability. This Comment
advocates, under the new Zivotofsky standard, for the Supreme Court
to review statutory and constitutional disputes arising from the War
Power’s resolution.
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I. Introduction
In an attempt to avoid the unilateral military authority of the
Monarch, the Founding Fathers divided power between the Legislative
and Executive branches. Notably, Congress held the power to declare
and fund war, while the President oversaw the armed forces as the
Commander-in-Chief. 2 But as times have changed, so too has almost
every aspect of military action. Some circumstances arise that could
call for military action but not war. In the modern era, this separation
of authority has led to a great debate over exactly where the line is
drawn between Presidential and Congressional authority. 3 In
particular, Congress has attempted to reign in the President’s ability
to circumvent Congress’ authority through “military action.” 4
In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”).5
Since its enactment the WPR has been a source for criticism, litigation,
and little enforcement. 6
The courts have developed a determined habit of avoiding cases
regarding the WPR by holding that the claims are not justiciable, or
unable to be heard by the courts, under the Art. III powers. 7 Lower
courts have clung to two legal theories to avoid WPR questions on the
2.

See generally U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, 11; U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2.

3.

See Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President
Under the War Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 84 (1984).

4.

Brian Egan & Tess Bridgeman, Top Experts’ Backgrounder: Military
Action Against Iran and US Domestic Law, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 3, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/64645/top-experts-backgrounder-militaryaction-against-iran-and-us-domestic-law/ [https://perma.cc/P3Y4QRWB].

5.

Vance, supra note 3, at 79.

6.

See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42699, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
CONCEPTS
AND
PRACTICE
1
(2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42699.pdf.

7.

See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming
dismissal for lack of standing without reaching justiciability); SanchezEspinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dismissing claim
as nonjusticiable political question); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355,
1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 515
(D.D.C. 1990) (same); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 341 (D.D.C.
1987) (same).
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merits; (1) a lack of standing 8 and (2) the involvement of a political
question 9. However, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Supreme Court
significantly limited the use of the political question doctrine as a
defense to a WPR challenge. 10
Zivotofsky has laid the groundwork for future substantive judicial
determinations on the delegations of foreign affairs and war powers
between the Executive and Congress. 11 The political question doctrine
is applied to cases where the courts find the issue constitutionally
delegated to another branch and outside the purview of the judicial
branch. 12 The political question doctrine can be applied in a number
of circumstances where courts examine whether a particular case is
justiciable and is “essentially a function of the separation of powers.”13
It is a limitation on the judiciary’s scope of their power and what they
are constitutionally authorized to hear. 14 Judicial intervention relating
to matters of foreign policy and national security is rarely proper
because they are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government that the Judiciary has no authority to judge their political
discretion. 15
Baker v. Carr, the formative case on the political question doctrine,
concerned a civil rights issue, but the Supreme Court took the liberty
to opine on the political question doctrine’s frequent applicability to
foreign affairs. 16 The Supreme Court found it could not reach a
judgement on the merits of a case if any of the following factors applied:
1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or 2) a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
8.

See, e.g., Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20. While the issue of standing poses a
barrier to litigation on the constitutionality of the WPR, the vast prior
literature, opposing arguments, and proposed solutions are outside the
scope of this comment. See generally Michael D. Ramsey, War Powers
Litigation After Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 177 (2018);
McKaye Neumeister, Note, Reviving the Power of the Purse:
Appropriation Clause Litigation and National Security Law, 127 YALE L.
J.. 2512 (2018); Samuel R. Howe, Note, Congress’s War Powers and the
Political Question Doctrine after Smith v. Obama, 68 DUKE L. J. 1231
(2019).

9.

See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 210; Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1357.

10.

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012).

11.

See Ramsey, supra note 8, at 177.

12.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).

13.

Id. at 217.

14.

See id. at 210-11.

15.

Id. at 211-12.

16.

See Baker, 369 U.S. 186.
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or 3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 4)
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of respect due coordinated branches of
government; or 5) unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or 6) the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. 17

The Baker factors have been used since to refrain from making a
judgment on the merits regarding issues of foreign affairs and political
questions. 18 In Zivotofsky, the scope of test is narrowed when dealing
with statutory issues and redefined the comparative importance of the
individual factors. 19 This Comment will propose that the Supreme
Court’s holding in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, has greatly altered the reach
of the political question doctrine’s applicability to statutory and
constitutional analysis and therefore the political question doctrine
should no longer have a blanket application to cases regarding the
WPR.

II. Zivotofsky v. Clinton
In 2002, Congress enacted a statute allowing Jerusalem-born U.S.
citizens to state their birthplace on their passports as “Israel.”20
Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky’s parents on behalf of Zivotofsky, an
American citizen born in Jerusalem, requested to the State Department
that his passport designate “Israel” as his birthplace. 21 The State
Department refused the request based on their policy, at the time, to
not recognize Jerusalem as a part of Israel. 22 The D.C. District Court
dismissed the case for lack of justiciability because the issue, as a matter
of foreign policy, fell under the political question doctrine. 23 The D.C.
Circuit Court affirmed. 24
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 8-1 majority, reversed the
D.C. Circuit stating that “[t]he courts are fully capable of determining
17.

Id. at 217.

18.

See e.g., Campbell, 203 F.3d 19 at 24-25 (Silberman, J., concurring);
Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 209; Ange, 752 F.Supp. at 512; Lowry, 676
F.Supp. at 339-40. See also Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1357.

19.

See generally Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. 189.

20.

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107228, § 214(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002).

21.

Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 193.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.
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whether [the] statute may be given effect, or instead struck down in
light of authority conferred on the Executive by the Constitution.”25
The claim in Zivotofsky required the Supreme Court to decide the
proper interpretation and constitutionality of the statute. 26 Since it is
the job of the judiciary “to say what the law is,” this was a “familiar
judicial exercise” for the court. 27
The statutory interpretation turned primarily on the
constitutionality of §214(d) which gave an individual, born in
Jerusalem, the right to have “Israel” listed as their place of birth on
their U.S. passport. 28 In determining if the political question doctrine
applied, Justice Roberts only chose to analyze the first two factors of
Baker; whether the issue at hand was a “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment” to a political department or whether it
lacked a “judicially manageable standard.” 29
The Supreme Court was not persuaded that the regulation of
passport policy is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
to a single branch. 30 Instead, more generally, it falls under the foreign
affairs power for which the branches have overlapping authority. 31 The
Government argued passport policymaking is within the President’s
exclusive “Political Recognition power.” 32 In opposition, Zivotofsky
argued that Congress had the authority, under its Naturalization
Power, to mandate the recognition of Israel on his passport. 33
While a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards is
often the impetus used to invoke the political question doctrine, in
Zivotofsky, the Supreme Court set a lower barrier for parties to prove
a manageable standard exists. 34 Justice Roberts points to the detailed
arguments proffered by both sides to emphasize the mere fact these
arguments could be levied indicates there was a manageable standard
for the Court to follow. 35
25.

Id. at 191.

26.

Id. at 196.

27.

Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).

28.

Id.

29.

Id. at 195, 197-98.

30.

Id. at 197.

31.

See id. at 201 (finding that “[r]esolution of Zivotofsky’s claim demands
careful examination of the textual, structural, and historical evidence put
forward by the parties regarding the nature of the statute and of the
passport and recognition powers”).

32.

Id. at 198.

33.

Id. at 199 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).

34.

See id. at 209-10 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

35.

Id. at 201.
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The D.C. Circuit had erred when it phrased its analysis around
the President’s decision and the exercise of such power cannot be
reviewed by the courts. 36 In Zivotofsky, the Supreme Court rephrased
the issue at hand within the case. Instead, they asked whether Congress
had the authority to pass a statute regulating passports or if that power
lies with the Executive. 37 The Supreme Court could avoid commenting
on the policy judgement of recognizing Jerusalem as part of Israel and
instead focus on the constitutionality of a statute which gave Congress
the power to set such a policy. 38 In coming to this conclusion, the
Supreme Court emphasized they cannot shy away from decisions of
statutory interpretation because of their prominent political
overtones. 39

III. Development of the Political Question Doctrine’s
Application to the War Powers
Zivotofsky follows a trend of cases discussing the importance of
judicial guidance on statutory interpretation even when foreign affairs
are involved. 40 In El-Shifa Pharmaceuticals Industries Co. v. U.S, 41 a
pharmaceutical company in Sudan sued President Clinton when he
bombed its warehouse for being a suspected terrorist site. El-Shifa
sought a declaration from the President stating that the government
incorrectly assumed El-Shifa’s terrorist affiliation and sought relief for
tort damages. 42 The D.C. Circuit refused to hear the case, holding that
the wisdom of the President’s military judgement was a political
question and chose not to analyze the statutory claim. 43
While presiding on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, in
his concurrence, disagreed and argued for limited deference toward the
historical precedent of the political question doctrine, stating, “[t]he
political question doctrine has occupied a more limited place in the
Supreme Court’s history than is sometimes assumed.” 44 Two years
before Zivotofsky, Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that the Supreme
Court has never applied the political question doctrine to statutory
36.

Id. at 193-94.

37.

Id. at 196.

38.

Id.

39.

Id. (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983)).

40.

See generally Campbell, 203 F.3d at 37–41 (Tatel, J., concurring); El-Shifa
Pharm. Indus. Co. v. U.S., 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Lowry, 676
F.Supp. 333.

41.

El Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d 836.

42.

Id. at 840.

43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 856 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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interpretation. 45 Though his reasoning differed from Justice Roberts in
Zivotofsky, Justice Kavanaugh felt the D.C. Circuit should abstain from
its use in this case and emphasized the consequences of the Court’s
silence. 46
In his concurrence, he stressed that by applying the political
question doctrine in statutory cases the court oversteps the stated
purpose which requires a constitutional “benign deference to political
branches.” 47 Instead, such an incorrect application of the political
question doctrine systematically favors one branch of government over
the other. 48 As applied in El-Shifa, it “sub silentio” increased executive
power, by failing to perform a statutory analysis the “court would be
establishing that the asserted Executive power is exclusive and
preclusive, meaning that Congress cannot regulate or limit that power
by a cause of action or otherwise.” 49 On the other hand, if the statute
clearly limited a sole power of the Executive, such as the delegated
power of Commander in Chief, then the court’s silence would
inappropriately expand the power of Congress. 50

IV. The Importance of Framing the Question
Presented
The holding of Zivotofsky relied on the framing of the question
presented. 51 Lower courts who had previously examined the political
question doctrine in the context of foreign affairs and war powers have
also wrestled with pinpointing the proper scope of the issue. 52 If there
is a strict adherence to statutory analysis regardless of issue, cases
involving traditionally political issues may be recast as judiciable by
any tenuous statutory claim. 53 In contrast, cases involving a statutory
or constitutional dilemma, with a political element, could be presented
as a political decision, but this would be a misapplication of the
45.

Id.

46.

Id. at 857.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50.

See Chris Michel, Comment, There’s No Such Thing as a Political
Question of Statutory Interpretation: The Implications of Zivotofsky v.
Clinton, 123 YALE L. J. 253, 262 (2013) (“If a statute invades a
constitutional power committed exclusively to the executive, the court
should invalidate the law ...”).

51.

See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. 189.

52.

See generally Campbell, 203 F.3d 19; El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607
F.3d 836.

53.

See El Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d. 850-51.
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doctrine. 54 Zivotofsky found it was within the Court’s discretion to
redefine the question and hear the case according to its statutory
claim. 55
Courts are also hesitant to elaborate on the constitutional
delegation of authority with regard to the WPR. 56 While the courts
have shied away from deciding what action is prudent within a
delegated power, they cannot hesitate to validate that the power is
constitutionally delegated. 57 In Zivotofsky, the D.C. Circuit reasoned
that the recognition of Jerusalem as a part of Israel was a political
matter and cannot be reviewed by the courts. 58 Instead, the Supreme
Court found it was not an issue of whether the U.S. is recognizing
Jerusalem as part of Israel, but whether the President must follow a
congressional mandate pertaining to passport policy. 59
In Campbell v. Clinton, members of Congress brought suit against
President Clinton for his use of extended military force in Kosovo in
opposition to their voting against further military action. 60 The D.C.
Circuit dismissed the case, in part, because the court did not have the
authority to “define war.” 61 Since there lacked a manageable standard
and the issue was committed to the decision of the other branches. 62 In
Campbell, the correct question to ask was whether Congress had the
authority, under Article I, to demand the President remove the Armed
Forces from hostilities despite the President’s Powers as Commander
in Chief. 63
Again, in El Shifa, the D.C. Circuit refused to review the
Executive’s “wisdom of retaliatory action taken by the United States.”64
54.

See Michel supra note 50, at 256–57 (noting the trend of lower federal
courts to find statutory political questions and arguing that this trend is
misguided).

55.

Zivotofsky 566 U.S. at 195.

56.

MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30352, WAR POWERS
LITIGATION INITIATED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SINCE THE ENACTMENT OF
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 15 (2012).

57.

See Bennett C. Rushkoff, A Defense of the War Powers Resolution, 93
YALE L. J. 1330, 1335–36 (1984); Delegation of Legislative Power, Legal
LAW
SCHOOL,
Information
Institute,
CORNELL
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section1/delegation-of-legislative-power, [https://perma.cc/H4NU-QT8W].

58.

Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 193–94.

59.

Id. at 196.

60.

Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20.

61.

Id. at 28.

62.

Id. at 24-25 (Silberman, J., concurring).

63.

See id. at 37 (Tatel, J., concurring)

64.

El Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d 851.
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As the concurring opinions suggest, this case, in reality, merely relied
upon whether there was a remedy available under a torts statute or a
common law cause for defamation. 65 The concern over an increase of
statutory claims altering the use of the political question doctrine is a
misunderstanding of the role of the judiciary. The judiciary’s role is to
distinguish issues and dismiss frivolous claims. 66 It is not the purpose
of political question doctrine to evade determining the applicability of
a statute. 67 The D.C. Circuit court should welcome the opportunity to
refine the boundaries of statutes that affect issues of foreign affairs such
as the Alien Tort statutes and the WPR.

V. The War Powers Resolution and Applying the
Baker Factors
In 1973, the WPR was enacted by Congress, in response to the
Vietnam war, as a means of restricting the President’s ability to enter
and maintain action by the U.S. military into international hostilities
and conflict. 68 The stated purpose of the WPR is to limit the
President’s authority to introduce the military into hostilities only in
the following situations: 1) an act of war; 2) statutory approval; or 3)
in the case of a national emergency. 69 The Act continues:
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United
States Armed Forces are introduced … into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances…the President shall submit within
48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to
the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing….
Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is
required to be submitted … the President shall terminate any use
of United States Armed Forces … unless the Congress:
(1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for
such use of United States Armed Forces,
65.

Id. at 853-55.

66.

See
Court
Role
and
Structure,
United
States
Courts,
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure
[https://perma.cc/PV72-M86T].

67.

See Michel, supra note 50, at 263 (arguing that, by doing so, “statutory
political questions deprive the government of valuable guidance by failing
to demarcate the boundaries of each branch’s authority”).

68.

War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2018); History.com
(June
10,
2019),
Editors,
War
Powers
Act,
HISTORY
https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/war-powers-act.

69.

50 U.S.C. § 1541(c).
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(2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or
(3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack
upon the United States.
Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an
additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to
the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity
respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires. 70

Since the statutes enactment there has been little evidence as to
whether it has had any actual effect on presidential action. 71 The
constitutionality of the WPR has never been decided. 72 No President
has ever formally conceded its constitutionality and some Presidents
have argued the WPR itself, or in part, is an unconstitutional overreach
by Congress. 73
A. Applying Baker to War Powers Resolution following Zivotofsky

The Supreme Court has only ever applied the political question
doctrine in two instances: 1) when the Constitution textually and
exclusively commits interpretation of the relevant constitutional
provision to one or both of the political branches, and 2) when there is
no manageable or judicial standards. 74
1. Textually and Exclusively Committed

First, when considering whether the Constitution textually and
exclusively commits an interpretation of a constitutional provision to
one or both of the political branches, the Supreme Court will find that
where the delegation of power is ambiguous, the Supreme Court has an
obligation to determine the constitutionality. 75 The war powers are not
specifically enumerated to just one of the branches. 76 The roles of
70.

50 U.S.C. §§ 1543–1544.

71.

John R. Cook, The War Powers Resolution-- A Dim and Fading Legacy,
45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 157, 157 (2012).

72.

See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (observing that the political question doctrine
often applies to issues of foreign affairs).

73.

Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution,
70 Vᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 101, 104 (1984); Michael A. Newton, Inadvertent
Implications of the War Powers Resolution, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
173, 174 (2012) (“The constitutional infirmity of the War Powers
Resolution . . . as a statutory straitjacket on executive authority has been
uniformly demonstrated by more than forty years of practice.”).

74.

Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. 195.

75.

See id. at 195–96 (finding that where there is no “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department,” the judiciary must then decide whether the “interpretation
of the statute is correct, and whether the statute is constitutional”).

76.

See generally U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, 11; U.S. Const. art. 2, §2.
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Congress and the President in foreign and military affairs “do not fit
neatly into the classic concepts of the separation of legislative and
executive powers.” 77 The war powers consist of competing and
intertwined delegations of power which the Court has felt the obligation
to untangle on many numerous occasions. 78
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 79 the subsequent Supreme Court decision of
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, compared the Recognition Power of the President
against the Naturalization Powers of Congress and found the power to
recognize a foreign government lies within the Executive branch,
making the law unconstitutional. 80 In the context of a war powers
question, there is arguably a necessity to compare the allocated powers
of the Commander in Chief to the President and the residual power of
the Vesting Clause to Congress’s right to declare war and raise an
army. 81
The Supreme Court’s refusal to address statutory issues of foreign
affairs fails to recognize the resulting implication to the structure of the
Constitution. 82 Judicial silence on claims made against the president
can lead to a sub silento increase in the power of the presidency. 83 When
a court fails to review the constitutionality of presidential actions not
compliant with the WPR, they increase presidential power by ignoring
the explicit power of Congress to declare war. 84 On the other hand, if
the WPR, or parts, are unconstitutional then the President is
improperly burdened with complying with its restrictions and
requirements and stripped of his right to discretion. 85 Even in cases
where the political question doctrine rendered and issue involving the
WPR non-justiciable, courts have not precluded all forms judicial

77.

Vance, supra note 3, at 84.

78.

Id.

79.

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 135 S.Ct. 2076 (2015)
[hereinafter Zivotofsky II].

80.

Id. at 2087–88, 2095.

81.

See generally Carter, supra note 73.

82.

See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43773, ZIVOTOFSKY V.
KERRY: THE JERUSALEM PASSPORT CASE AND ITS POTENTIAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS 23 (2015)
(discussing implications on Congress’s ability to refute future claims of
exclusive executive power).

83.

See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 855 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).

84.

Id. at 857 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

85.

See id. at 859 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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review on the constitutionality of the WPR. 86 On the other hand, the
D.C. Circuit has stated that “[a] true confrontation between the
Executive and a unified Congress as evidenced by its passage of
legislation to enforce the Resolution, would pose a question ripe for
judicial review.” 87
2. Lack of Judicially Manageable Standards

In Zivotofsky, Justice Roberts holding practically eliminated the
second Baker factor, “a lack of judicially manageable standards,” by
stating there is a manageable legal standard if cognizable arguments
are able to be made for both sides. 88 By this measure, the vast scholarly
literature and litigation surrounding the WPR represents the already
existing legal standards and arguments that can be levied around the
constitutionality of the statute. 89
Some argue that past practice and the history of presidential action
in war-time has also created a standard for the Supreme Court to follow
as to where the authority truly lies. Some scholars argue that “[b]ehind
the legal bickering, a complex, but unstated, operational code has
developed, allocating competence to initiate, direct, and terminate
different types of coercion among the branches.” 90 This operational
code works as a constitutional common law developed with regards to
use of force that did not amount to war. 91 Previously, the President has
used force outside the purviews of the WPR and authorization of force
from Congress when he felt it was necessary to protect national
interests. 92 Congress was often compliant in the past while the judiciary
validated these actions with rulings or with silence. 93 These previous
86.

See Lowry, 676 F.Supp. at 339 (D.D.C.1987) (finding an issue involving
the War Powers Resolution nonjusticiable under the political question
doctrine, but noting that “[j]udicial review of the constitutionality of the
War Powers Resolution is not [] precluded by this decision”).

87.

Id.

88.

See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 201 (“Recitation of these arguments—which
sound in familiar principles of constitutional interpretation—is enough to
establish that this case does not ‘turn on standards that defy judicial
application.’”).

89.

See generally Carter, supra note 73; William Michael Treanor, Fame, the
Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1997);
Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War
Powers Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1149 (2001).

90.

Corn, supra note 89, at 1185 (quoting W. Michael Reisman, War Powers:
The Operational Code of Competence, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 777, 777–78
(1989)).

91.

Id. (citing Reisman, supra note 90, at 781).

92.

Id.

93.

Id.
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instances have created a “historical gloss” that overshadows war powers
disputes. 94 This has set a precedent that places the WPR in conflict
with the historical approach to war powers, and therefore provides
future legal standards for WPR challenges. 95
According to Justice Sotomayor, in her concurrence in Zivotofsky,
the third factor, “disputes [that call] for decision making beyond the
court’s competence” can be applied in conjunction with the second
factor 96 Following this logic, the WPR is not beyond the scope of the
Court’s competence because of the previously stated reasons that
revolve around the robust debate over the conflicting powers of war
and the years of historical precedent.
3. Prudential Concerns

In Zivotofsky, Justice Roberts does not even recognize the last three
of the Baker factors that Justice Sotomayor refers to as the “prudential
concerns.” 97
While still acknowledging their existence, Justice
Sotomayor, in her concurrence, urges courts to be “particularly cautious
before forgoing adjudication of a dispute” on the basis on the last three
factors, 98 emphasizing prudential concerns have only ever been
asserted, by the Supreme Court, in dicta like Justice Breyer’s dissent.99
The fourth factor of the Baker considers “the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
respect due coordinated branches of government.” 100 This factor, though
addressed in Baker, is diminished as a result of Zivotofsky which clearly
states that the Courts may not shy away from problems that are
political in nature. 101 Cases regarding the WPR most likely occur when
both the Executive have reached an impasse. When Congress and the
Executive are at odds with the designated military action, the judiciary
must step in and cannot avoid a ruling on statutory issues for fear of
stepping on the toes of the other branches. 102
Under the fifth factor, the Court may find an “unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made.” 103 In the
94.

See id. at 1156–64, for a discussion of the “historical gloss” concept in
separation-of-powers analysis.

95.

See id. at 1187–1188.

96.

Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 203 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

97.

Id.

98.

Id. at 204 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

99.

See id. at 186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

100. Baker, 369 U.S. 217.
101. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. 204-05.
102. See id. at 205.
103. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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context of the WPR, judicial deference to ongoing military actions
could be expected to fall under this standard and possibly prevent a
court from ordering an injunction against the President to remove
troops. 104 But if the President is found to be involved in an
unconstitutional conflict, the Court should not avoid the question but
instead find a practical remedy that does not endanger troops. 105
The sixth and final factor considers whether, upon the court’s
judgment, “there is a potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.” 106 Concern
about the judiciary causing embarrassment seems frivolous in relation
to Congress and the President’s long history of public disagreements
and lawsuits over military power. Since the Supreme Court makes the
final decision about constitutionality, there is no danger “multifarious
pronouncements” since the judgment will be binding on all branches.107
These ongoing lawsuits are in fact already sources of potential
embarrassment and a judicial ruling may once and for all render a final
and singular explanation for the constitutionality of the WPR and the
lengths the President may go as Commander-in-Chief.
B. Judicial Analysis Applicable to WPR
I. Statutory Analysis

One of the many constitutional questions regarding the war powers
is whether the country is “at war.” The courts have been reluctant to
hear cases that would define this constitutional term. 108 With regards
to the WPR, the confusion revolves around the statutory term
“hostilities”. 109 Many critics of the WPR question the validity of
Section 5(b) that states after 92 days the president must remove troops
104. See generally Brett M. Kavanaugh, Congress and the President in
(Nov.
29,
2017),
Wartime,
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/congress-and-president-wartime
(reviewing DAVID BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN THE
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS (2016)).
105. See id.
106. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
107. See The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED
STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx
[https://perma.cc/MA2J-8XFQ].
108. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 26 (Silberman, J., concurring) (observing no
authority to define when “war” has been “declared”); Dellums, 752
F.Supp. at 1146 (noting in dicta that the action would amount to “war,”
but denying preliminary injunction for lack of ripeness).
109. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 25 (Silberman, J., concurring) (“Prior litigation
under the WPR has turned on the threshold test whether U.S. forces are
engaged in hostilities or are in imminent danger of hostilities.”).
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from hostilities, unless he receives constitutional approval. 110 A case
may arise challenging the controversial 5(b) provision, posing the
question as to whether Congress has the power to dictate through
statute the proper movement of troops and military action, in which
normally lies with executive, unanswered.
In the past, Congress and the President have disagreed on the
definition of “hostilities.” 111 If the forces are not in hostilities, they do
not need to be removed, but the WPR fails to define “hostilities.”112
When Barak Obama sent troops to Libya in 2011, he determined, at
the advice of the U.S. Department of State Legal advisor, Harold Koh,
that the military actions in Libya did not amount to hostilities. 113 Koh
determined that military action does not amount to hostilities if the
mission is limited, the exposure of the armed forces is limited, risk of
escalation is limited, and the military means are limited. 114
More recently, there is a disagreement between Congress and the
Trump Administration as to whether U.S. forces assisting the Saudiled coalition in Yemen have been introduced into active or imminent
hostilities for purposes of the WPR. 115 Some Members of Congress
claimed that by providing support to the Saudi Arabia, U.S. forces have
been introduced into a “situation where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated” according to the WPR. 116 In 2019, the
House passed a joint resolution “Directing the removal of United States
Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not
been authorized by Congress.” 117 In response, then-Acting General
Counsel of the Department of Defense, William Castle, released a letter
arguing that the premise of the proposed resolution was “flawed”
because it incorrectly asserted that U.S. forces had been introduced into

110. Vance, supra note 3, at 84-86.
111. See id. at 92–93 (suggesting an amendment to the WPR that would define
“hostilities” due to Presidents avoiding the WPR by construing military
actions as not involving “hostilities”).
112. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 112th Cong. 13 (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal
Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State).
113. Id. at 14-16.
114. Id.
115. CONG. RESEARCG SERV., R45046, CONGRESS AND THE WAR
OVERSIGHT AND LEGISLATION 2015-2019, at 9–10 (2019).
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id. at 15.
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“hostilities. 118 Consistent with this opinion, President Trump vetoed
the resolution. 119
Courts have applied the political question doctrine in cases
involving hostilities because they thought it required political
judgment. 120 A long history of these cases have stated that the courts
are not equipped to determine “what is war.” 121 The better question
for the judiciary may be “who has the power to define what is war?”.
Congress has assigned the term “hostilities” as to the scope of the
WPR. 122 Because of the lack of any judicial guidance, the Executive
has been defining the scope of the word. 123 A task the Court may find
is in the power of Congress or its own purview. Better defining scope
hostilities is statutory analysis and not a “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment.” 124 Further resolving WPR disputes would
require a judgement of whether the military action was wise, but
whether the President possessed legal authority to conduct the military
operation. 125
II. Determining the Delegation and Scope of Presidential Authority

The Supreme Court found in Zivotofsky it must determine which
branch had the right to make policy as a question of constitutional and
statutory interpretation. 126 A lack of a specified delegation of war
powers does not immediately create a gap that cannot be remedied by
judicial means. For many years, the ambiguity of presidential power
has been analyzed by the courts using a three-part analysis first
proposed in Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer. 127 First, the President’s authority is strongest when he
“acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,” for
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress

118. Oona A. Hathaway, et al., Yemen: Is the U.S. Breaking the Law?, 10
HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 1, 20 (2019).
119. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45046, CONGRESS AND THE WAR
OVERSIGHT AND LEGISLATION 2015-2019, at 15 (2019).
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120. See generally Campbell, 203 F.3d at 37-41(Tate, J. concurring).
121. Id. at 25-26 (Silberman, J., concurring).
122. See id. at 25 (Silberman, J., concurring).
123. See Vance, supra note 3, at 92.
124. See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 195–96.
125. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 40.
126. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 196.
127. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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can delegate.” 128 Second, there is a “zone of twilight” where there is an
“absence of either a congressional grant of denial of authority.” 129 This
creates a form of concurrent authority. 130 Third, when the President
acts incompatibly with Congressional mandates “he can rely only upon
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter.” 131 To succeed in this third category, the
President’s asserted power must be both “exclusive” and “conclusive”
on the issue. 132
Conflicts surrounding the WPR fall under the third tier of the
Youngstown Sheet model where the president has the least amount of
independent authority since his actions are in direct conflict with the
WPR. 133 The President’s power must be exclusive and conclusive.134
The courts will have to determine if his role as commander in chief,
head of state, or other constitutional authority rise to such a level. The
Supreme Court’s tendency to avoid the nuances of the delegation of
power within foreign affairs, in favor of a political solution, shirks the
very important constitutional test set in Youngstown Sheet.

VI. Conclusion
Currently, the WPR is to some mostly ignored. 135 No president has
acknowledged its constitutionality. 136 There is no indication that any
president has refrained from utilizing U.S. military force solely because
of the WPR, 137 instead, continuous and constant Executive Actions
make the resolution itself “something of an archaic expression of an
earlier era of American politics.” 138 The multiple, fruitless lawsuits
brought by Congress, have further “implicitly reinforced the impotence
of the Resolution with startling clarity. 139 If the Court’s concerns in
Baker surrounding the three branches’ exhibition of an impartiality
and an undivided front in the face of serious political action, each time
128. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 637.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 637–38.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Cook, supra note 71, at 157.
136. Id. at 159.
137. Id. at 160.
138. Newton, supra note 73, at 174.
139. Id.
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the President’s is forced to act inconsistently with the WPR displays a
striking flaw in the balance of our three branches of power.
The WPR fails to recognize modern-day military action and the
technological abilities that now allow war to be conducted through
drone strikes and cyber-attacks. Military action no longer consists
solely of sending fighting troops into foreign territory. 140 Drone strikes
are now a common form of military action as opposed to the kinds
anticipated by the drafters of the statute. 141 These attacks can be
carried out in hours and therefore would be over before the President
was required to notify Congress of any action. Moreover, drone strikes
have historically not fallen within the established definition of Armed
forces in areas of hostilities. 142 Drone strikes require no “on-site
military,” but may have the same military and foreign affairs
consequences as a traditional military action. 143 The WPR may have
been an attempt to limit the scope of unauthorized military action,
however, because the courts have refused to apply it to the changing
battlefield, Presidents have continued to engage in conflicts without
constitutional certainty.
Zivotofsky illustrates the Court’s previous deference to the
President’s foreign affairs decision has taken a backseat to the concern
for statutory and constitutional interpretation by the courts. The
Court still may not question the wisdom of an Executive acting within
his specified foreign affairs role, but, they no longer abstain when there
are competing laws and interests. The Court continues to defer to the
Executive when acting within his specified foreign affairs role, but, the
Court no longer abstains when there are competing laws and interests.
The weakened potency of the Baker factors may allow cases to be
brought to question the depth of the presidential power or, in contrast,
the validity of the WPR itself. The WPR poses many structural
concerns for the Court to address, while policy concerns weigh in the
favor of judicial involvement. With the evolution of war and our
constant state of conflict, these crucial and frequently performed powers
must be defined by the Court.
The D.C. circuit, as the major venue for such cases, can no longer
hide behind the presence of a military action, a controversial
international conflict, or murky international law, but must follow
Supreme Court precedent. After Zivotofsky and the appointment of
Justice Kavanaugh, the Court may be more inclined and better poised
to analyze the overall separation of powers when it comes to the
intricacies of the war powers and the unexplored constitutionality of
140. Amy Bryne, A Dangerous Custom: Reigning in the Use of Signature
Strikes Outside Recognized Conflicts, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 620, 644
(2018).
141. See Id.
142. Id.
143. See Id.
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the WPR. They have a responsibility to hear these arguments and
weigh in on statutory and constitutional authority.
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